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Employee Retention Credit 
	 A	credit	 is	allowed	of	40	percent	of	qualified	wages	up	to	
$6,000	for	employees	(of	200	or	fewer	employees)	in	a	core	
disaster area. Act § 202. 
Temporary Suspension of Limit on Charitable 
Contributions 
The contribution limits of I.R.C.§ 170(b), by election, do 
not apply to contributions for relief efforts related to Hurricane 
Katrina, during the period of August 28, 2005, through 
December 31, 2005. Act § 301. 
Additional Exemption for Displaced Individuals 
	 The	Act	allows	a	$500	reduction	in	taxable	income	for	each	 
Hurricane	Katrina	displaced	individual	not	to	exceed	$2,000.
Act § 302.

Increase in Mileage Rate for Charitable use of Vehicles

For the period of August 25, 2005, and ending on December 
31, 2006, the standard mileage rate for charitable driving for 
providing relief related to Hurricane Katrina is 70 percent of the 
standard mileage rate for business driving (34 cents per mile).
Act § 303. 
Mileage Reimbursements to Charitable Volunteers Excluded 
from Gross Income 
Reimbursements for vehicles used to provide relief relating 
to Hurricane Katrina from August 25, 2005, through December 
31, 2006, are excluded from income. Act § 304. 
Charitable Deductions for Contributions of Food 
Inventory 
The legislation permanently amends the Internal Revenue 
Code to allow a charitable contribution deduction, within limits, 
for contributions of food inventory. Act § 305, amending I.R.C. 
§ 170(e). 
Charitable Deduction for Contributions of Book 
Inventories 
The Act permanently amends the Internal Revenue Code to 
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provide for charitable contributions of books to public schools, 
through December 31, 2005. Act § 306, amending I.R.C. § 
170(e). 
Cancellations of Indebtedness 
The Act provides that discharges of indebtedness of a natural 
person whose place of abode was in the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster area and suffered economic loss or in the core disaster 
area are not includible in income other than for indebtedness 
incurred in connection with a trade or business. Act § 401. 
Suspension of Limits on Personal Casualty Losses 
	 The	 $100	 deductible	 on	 personal	 casualty	 losses	 and	 the	
limitation of losses to those above 10 percent of adjusted gross 
income are suspended for losses on or after August 25, 2005, 
attributable to Hurricane Katrina. Act § 402. 
Extension of Replacement Period 
	 The	Act	 substitutes	five	 years	 for	 two	years	 for	 replacing	
property in the Hurricane disaster area which is compulsorily 
or involuntarily converted on or after August 25, 2005, by 
reason of Hurricane Katrina if substantially all of the use of the 
replacement property is in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area.
Act § 405.

Determining Earned Income

	 The	legislation	specifies	that	if	the	earned	income	of	a	qualified	
individual (individual whose principal place of abode on August 
25, 2005, was located in the core disaster area or the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster area and was displaced) for the taxable year 
which includes August 25, 2005, is less than earned income for 
the preceding taxable year, the earned income of the preceding 
year can be substituted. Act § 406. 
Dependency Status 
The Department of the Treasury is given authority to assure 
that taxpayers do not lose by virtue of temporary relocations by 
reason of Hurricane Katrina. Act § 407. 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRuPTCy 
GENERAL

DISCHARGE. The debtors, husband and wife, owned a dairy 

supply business through a corporation. The corporation purchased 

goods	 from	 a	 creditor	 on	 credit	 and	 filed	 for	 Chapter	 7	 with	
amounts owed to the creditor. A judgment had been obtained 
against the debtors which held that the debtors were liable for 
some of the corporation’s debts to the creditor under alter-ego 
liability.	The	creditor	filed	a	motion	to	have	the	amount	owed	to	 
the creditor declared nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(4) 
for	 fraud	 or	 defalcation	 while	 acting	 in	 a	 fiduciary	 capacity,	
embezzlement or larceny. The creditor alleged that the judgment 
demonstrated that the debtors had commingled funds with the 
corporation and had failed to disclose the use of the corporation
as the debtors’alter-ego. The creditor also alleged that the debtors 
failed to return property not paid for upon demand and to return 
marketing	products.	 	The	 creditor	 also	filed	 a	motion	 to	 deny	
discharge of the claim under Section 523(a)(6) for willful and 
malicious injury to the creditor’s property. The court denied 
the	 first	 motion,	 holding	 that	 the	 debtors	were	 not	 acting	 in	 a	
fiduciary	capacity	in	purchasing	goods	from	the	creditor	and	did	 
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not commit any embezzlement or larceny in the purchase of the 
goods themselves or through the corporation. The court also 
denied the second motion, holding that no conversion of the 
creditor’s property occurred and that the transaction involved 
only the sale of goods without payment, an action which did not 
prohibit discharge of the debt. In re Hoyt, 326 B.R. 13 (Bankr. 
W.D. N.y. 2005). 
FEDERAL TAX 
INTEREST ON TAXES. The debtor had owned two 
corporations which had failed to pay federal employment taxes. 
The debtor was assessed these taxes as a responsible person for 
the corporations after the corporations were liquidated without 
paying	the	taxes.		The	IRS	filed	claims	for	the	taxes,	plus	interest	
and penalties, in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. The case continued 
for over 10 years and the IRS submitted a compromise which 
waived all pre-petition interest in exchange for full payment of 
the taxes. The compromise was agreed to by the debtor and the 
taxes were paid in full. The record did not indicate any conclusion 
to the bankruptcy case. The IRS then attempted to collect the 
post-petition interest on the taxes, arguing that the compromise 
agreement covered only the payment of interest by the bankruptcy 
estate, which was liable only for pre-petition interest, and not 
with the debtor personally. The debtor argued that the bankruptcy 
estate was liable for the post-petition interest as well under Section 
726(a)(5) because the debtor was insolvent. The court held that 
Section 726(a)(5) did not relieve the debtor of liability for the 
tax interest; it only made the estate available to pay the interest 
if assets were available. The court also held that the compromise 
agreement was clear that the IRS agreed to waive only pre-petition 
interest claims against the estate and did not make any provision 
for post-petition interest. Because the post-petition interest was 
not paid from the estate and the agreement did not waive the 
debtor’s personal liability for the interest, the debtor remained 
liable for the interest, which was nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 
In re Tashjian, 325 B.R. 56 (D. Mass. 2005). 
CONTRACTS 
DAMAGES. The plaintiff contracted with the defendant to 
harvest the defendant’s cotton. The plaintiff’s usual practice was 
to	harvest	a	third	party’s	cotton	first	because	it	usually	matured	
first;	however,	in	one	year	the	third	party’s	cotton	matured	late	
and the plaintiff was delayed in getting to the defendant’s crop. 
Instead of waiting, the defendant borrowed and leased harvesting 
equipment and was able to complete the harvest before the 
plaintiff was done with the third party’s harvesting. Although the 
parties were in continual contact during the harvest, the plaintiff 
turned down other harvesting work before learning that the 
defendant would not need the plaintiff’s services. The plaintiff 
sued for breach of contract. The plaintiff also sought damages in 
promissory estoppel because the plaintiff claimed that the plaintiff 
incurred repair expenses in reliance on the need to harvest the 
defendant’s crop. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s failure 
to timely harvest the crop excused the defendant’s performance 
under the contract. In the alternative, the defendant argued that 
the	costs	of	finding	replacement	harvesting	equipment	should	be	
offset against any damages incurred by the plaintiff. In addition, the 
defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to mitigate any damages 
by failing to seek other harvesting work. The trial court held that 
the parties had not entered into a contract with an open-ended 
harvesting date, which would be unreasonable for harvesting a 
mature	crop.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	on	this	point,	holding	
that where a contract was unclear as to time of performance, 
the contract would be interpreted as requiring performance in a 
reasonable time. For mature crops, a reasonable time would need 
to be within the time required to preserve the crop. Because the 
plaintiff failed to harvest the crop within a reasonable time, the 
defendant was free to seek alternate methods of harvesting the 
crop.	The	trial	court,	however,	awarded	lost	profits	to	the	plaintiff	
based on the defendant’s failure to give notice that the defendant 
was harvesting the crop with borrowed equipment. The appellate 
court reversed on this point, holding that once the plaintiff failed 
to perform within a reasonable time, the defendant was not under 
any duty to give notice of the replacement harvest method. Both 
courts denied the plaintiff’s claim in promissory estoppel for the 
cost of the repairs to the harvester equipment, citing evidence 
that the repairs were necessary in any case and were not made 
specifically	to	enable	the	plaintiff	to	harvest	the	defendant’s	crop.	
Taylor v. George, 2005 Ark. App. LEXIS 568 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2005).
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
FIELD BuRNING. The plaintiff was a grass seed grower in 
Washington	where	field	burning	was	illegal	without	a	burn	waiver	
granted	by	the	state.	In	order	to	clear	the	field	of	stubble,	the	stubble	
must be cleared using a baler or by burning. The plaintiff’s property 
included a substantial area which was too steep for use of a baler 
and the plaintiff applied for a waiver for the portion too steep for 
mechanical harvesting. The plaintiff had used the property for 
grass seed growing for over 10 years and had previously used 
only burning. The burn waiver was denied on the basis that burn 
waivers	could	be	granted	only	for	the	first	through	fourth	growing	
seasons, requiring a one year non-growing season before waivers 
could be granted again for the next four years. The plaintiff burned 
the	field	without	a	waiver	and	received	a	$10,000	fine.	The	trial	
court upheld the state Department of Ecology’s application of 
the	five-year	rotation	period	(four	burn	waiver	years	followed	by	
one non-waiver year). The state argued that its interpretation of 
the no burning rule allowed it to determine the proper method of 
granting waivers and that the plaintiff could still obtain waivers by 
destroying	the	fields	in	the	fifth	year,	restarting	the	waiver	cycle.	
The plaintiff argued that the statute allowed waivers in all cases 
where no mechanical means of removing stubble was available.
The	plaintiff	argued	that	destroying	a	crop	every	five	years	was	
not	 intended	 by	 the	 legislature.	 	The	 court	 first	 noted	 that	 the	
statute focused on seeking alternative means of stubble removal
before burning could be prohibited. The Department of Ecology 
established the mechanical residue management method as a 
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substitute measure for burning and properly prohibited burning 
where the alternative was available. The court held, however, 
that	the	imposition	of	a	fifth-year	destruction	of	the	crop	was	
not part of the mechanical residue management method because 
it cause the destruction of the crop and not merely the removal 
of stubble, thus exceeding the department’s authority under the 
statute. The court held that the waiver was improperly denied 
and	reversed	the	imposition	of	the	fine.		110 P.3d 823 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
FEDERAL AGRICuLTuRAL 
PROGRAMS 
DISASTER PAyMENTS. The 2004 Dairy DisasterAssistance 
Payment	Program	was	established	to	provide	up	to	$10	million	
in assistance to dairy producers in counties declared disaster 
areas by the President due to hurricanes in 2004. The CCC has 
adopted	as	final	regulations	implementing	the	program.		70 Fed. 
Reg. 56113 (Sept. 26, 2005). 
GuARANTEED LOANS. The	 FSA	 has	 adopted	 as	 final	
regulations amending its regulations governing loans made under 
the	guaranteed	farm	loan	program	to	specifically	allow	lenders	to	
use the loans as security for loans to the lenders, remove certain 
documentation and designation requirements for lenders, and 
modify	security	restrictions	as	to	refinancing	and	junior	liens.	
70 Fed. Reg. 56105 (Sept. 26, 2005). 
POuLTRy INSPECTION. The FSIS has issued a reminder 
that all poultry slaughter establishments that, under the Poultry 
Products Inspection Act (PPIA) and regulations, live poultry 
must be handled in a manner that is consistent with good 
commercial practices, which means they should be treated 
humanely.	Although	there	is	no	specific	federal	humane	handling	
and slaughter statute for poultry, under the PPIA, poultry products 
are more likely to be adulterated if, among other circumstances, 
they are produced from birds that have not been treated humanely, 
because such birds are more likely to be bruised or to die other 
than by slaughter. 70 Fed. Reg. 56624 (Sept. 28, 2005). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
ESTATE PROPERTy. The decedent had established a series 
of	trusts	as	remainder	beneficiaries	of	the	the	decedent’s	IRA.	 
The decedent died before the IRA began distributions. Each 
beneficiary’s	interest	in	the	trust	terminated	upon	the	death	of	the	
beneficiary.	If	a	beneficiary	becomes	a	trustee	of	the	beneficiary’s	
trust,	the	beneficiary	did	not	have	a	power	of	appointment	over	
the	trust	corpus.	If	the	beneficiary	did	not	become	a	trustee,	the	
beneficiary	had	only	a	limited	power	of	appointment	over	the	
trust corpus. The IRS ruled that the trust corpus would not be 
included	in	a	beneficiary’s	estate	(1)	under	I.R.C.	§	2033	because	
the	 interest	 terminated	at	 the	beneficiary’s	death	or	 (2)	under	 
I.R.C.	§	2041	because	the	beneficiary	did	not	have	a	general	
power of appointment over trust corpus. Ltr. Rul. 200537044, 
March 29, 2005. 
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. The decedent 
owned a non-qualified annuity contract under which no 
payments had been made to the decedent. The estate 
surrendered the contract for an amount greater than the date 
of death value, with most of the value increase resulting from 
post-death accrued interest. The proceeds of the annuity were 
distributed among several charitable organizations named in 
the	decedent’s	will	as	residual	beneficiaries.		The	IRS	ruled	that	 
the excess of the proceeds of the annuity over the date of death 
value was income in respect of decedent and included in the 
estate’s taxable income, with a charitable deduction allowed 
for the distribution of the same amount to the charities. Ltr. 
Rul. 200537019, May 25, 2005. 
RETuRNS.	A	decedent’s	estate	filed	its	income	tax	return	 
based	on	an	fiscal	year	which	did	not	end	on	the	last	day	of	a	
month.	The	IRS	ruled	that	the	estate	had	to	file	an	amended	 
return	using	a	fiscal	year	which	did	end	on	the	last	day	of	a	
month. Ltr. Rul. 200537019, May 25, 2005. 
VALuATION. The decedent’s estate included 2,095 acres 
of	rural	land,	including	timberland,	open	fields	and	former	rice	
fields.	The	estate’s	appraisals	of	the	property	were	based	on	
the highest and best use of the property as mixed agriculture, 
including limited timber harvesting, animal farming, and 
recreation such as hunting. The estate appraisal discounted 
the value of the timber because the removal of much of the 
less marketable timber would detract from the value of the 
surrounding land without providing substantial income. The 
IRS appraisal generally agreed as to the best and highest use, 
but focused more on the valuation of the property as a timber 
harvesting business; thus, the IRS appraisal gave full value to 
all the marketable timber. The court rejected the IRS description 
of the best use of the land because the area surrounding the 
decedent’s land was valued as primarily recreational land, with 
only minimal timber harvesting. In addition, the comparable 
properties in the area supported the characterization of the 
decedent’s property because they had very similar uses. Estate 
of Kolczynski v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-217. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
BAD DEBT. The taxpayer corporation had transferred funds 
to a limited liability company owned by the corporation’s 
officers.	 	The	 corporation	 claimed	 a	 bad	 deduction	 for	 the	
transferred funds when the LLC failed. The court held that 
no debt existed because the transfer was not formalized with 
a	 promissory	 note,	 no	maturity	 date	 was	 fixed,	 no	 interest	
was charged, no collateral was given and no repayments 
were demanded or made. In addition, the court held that 
the	 amounts	 transferred	 were	 transferred	 by	 the	 officers	 as	
individuals, even though the funds came from the corporation’s 
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accounts; therefore, even if a debt existed, the corporation was 
not the lender. Under a similar reason, the corporation could 
not claim a loss deduction for the transferred funds because 
the corporation did not receive an equity interest in the LLC, 
because	the	officers	received	the	interests	in	the	LLC.	 Hubert 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. No. 6 (2005). 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBuTIONS. The taxpayers 
formed a limited liability company which purchased real 
property on which was situated a retreat used for religious 
instruction.	The	purchase	price	was	$75,000.		The	retreat	was	
operated by a separate charitable organization under a one 
dollar monthly lease from the LLC. The operating organization 
performed maintenance on the property but made no structural 
improvements or additions to the property. About 17 months 
after the purchase, the LLC donated the property to the 
operating organization and claimed a charitable deduction 
of	$475,000	based	on	an	appraisal	of	the	property.	The	IRS	
challenged the deduction on the basis that the fair market value 
of	the	property	was	only	$76,200	at	the	time	of	the	donation.	
The court upheld the IRS valuation, giving the strongest weight 
to the original sale of the property to the LLC because the sale 
was between a willing seller and willing buyer. The court noted 
that no substantial change was made to the property between 
the purchase and donation and that the LLC’s appraisal was 
not credible because the appraiser was not independent, the 
comparable property sales used by the appraiser were not 
similar rural property, and the appraisal did not account for the 
purchase price paid by the LLC. The court also noted that the 
county	assessor	valued	the	property	at	$70,000	for	property	tax	 
purposes. Wortmann v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-227. 
COuRT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
had	filed	a	contract	damage	claim	against	a	former	business	
associate. The lawsuit petition did not allege any claim for 
defamation,	libel,	intentional	infliction	of	emotional	distress	
or damage to personal reputation, although the taxpayer had 
made such claims in a letter published to the public. The parties 
reached a settlement and the taxpayer excluded the settlement 
proceeds, arguing that the payment was made to settle the 
personal injury claims. Although the court acknowledged that 
settlement	 proceeds	 for	 intentional	 infliction	 of	 emotional	
distress were excludible from income, the court held that the 
proceeds were received only for settlement of the contract 
claims; therefore, the proceeds were included in the taxpayer’s 
taxable income. Bradley v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-
223.

CORPORATIONS

STOCK OPTIONS. The taxpayer was an employee of a 
corporation and received grants of options to purchase stock 
in the corporation as part of the taxpayer’s compensation. 
The taxpayer borrowed money which was used to exercise 
the option to purchase the stock for about 5 percent of the 
stock fair market value. the stock was used as collateral for 
the loan. Although the stock was subject to sale restrictions, 
the stock entitled the taxpayer to dividends and voting rights. 
The taxpayer argued that, because a loan was used to obtain the 
stock, the taxpayer did not realize wage income from the option 
until substantial payments were made on the loan. The court held 
that	the	exercise	of	the	option	was	sufficient	to	realize	the	income	
from the difference in the amount paid and the fair market value of 
the stock because the taxpayer received full rights in the stock and 
paid the corporation for the stock. The taxpayer also argued that 
the resale restrictions also delayed the recognition of income from 
the exercise of the option. The court held that, although the resale 
of the stock was limited, the taxpayer would not lose the stock if a 
sale was attempted. The court found that no other substantial risk of 
forfeiture existed; therefore, the taxpayer obtained full ownership 
of the stock upon exercise of the option and the taxpayer’s income
included the difference between the amount paid and the fair market 
value of the stock. Hilen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-226. 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer had a 
credit card account and had written to the credit card company to 
verify the balance on the account. The taxpayer then made a cash 
withdrawal on that account and made several minimal payments 
on the account. The taxpayer and credit card company disputed 
several late charges and the interest rate over several months. The 
credit card company eventually offered a substantially reduced 
amount to settle the account, which the taxpayer paid. The credit 
card company issued a Form 1099-C and listed the reduction 
amount,	over	$19,000,	as	discharge	of	indebtedness	income	to	the	
taxpayer. The credit card company based the amount on the balance 
shown on their records as of the settlement date less the settlement 
amount paid by the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the account 
reduction was not discharge of indebtedness but a determination 
of the true balance of the account reached by negotiation of a 
disputed claim. The court held that the taxpayer had discharge of 
indebtedness	income	in	the	amount	of	the	verified	balance	plus	
the cash withdrawal less the amount of monthly payments made 
and	the	final	settlement	amount.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	in	a	
decision designated as not for publication. Earnshaw v. Comm’r, 
2005-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,566 (10th Cir. 2005), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 2002-191. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On September 14, 2005, the president 
determined that certain areas in North Carolina are eligible for 
assistance from the government under the Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of 
Hurricane Ophelia, which began on September 11, 2005. FEMA-
3261-EM. On September 21, 2005, the president determined 
that all counties in Texas are eligible for assistance from the 
government under the Act as a result of Hurricane Rita, which 
began on September 20, 2005. FEMA-3261-EM. Taxpayers who 
sustained losses attributable to the disaster may deduct the losses 
on their 2004 returns. 
The President has declared that all areas in Michigan, District 
of Columbia, Washington, Oregon, New Mexico, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Missouri, South Carolina, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
Kansas, Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Virginia, Arizona, Minnesota, 
Nevada, Idaho, Nebraska, Connecticut, North Dakota, California, 
Wisconsin, Ohio, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Rhode 
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Island, Maine, New Jersey and New Hampshire were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act	(42	U.S.C.	§	5121)	as	a	result	of	the	influx	of	refugees	from	
Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 29, 2005. FEMA-3225-
EM through 3258-EM. 
EMPLOyEE BENEFITS. The IRS has released the 
applicable terminal charge and the Standard Industry Fare Level 
(SIFL) mileage rates for determining the value of noncommercial 
flights	on	employer-provided	aircraft	in	effect	for	July	1,	2005	
through December 31, 2005 for purposes of the taxation of fringe 
benefits.	The	terminal	charge	is	$35.51	and	the	SIFL	rates	are:	
$.1926	 per	 mile	 for	 the	 first	 500	 miles;	 $.1468	per	mile	 501	
through	1,500	miles;	and	$.1412	per	mile	over	1,500	miles.	Rev. 
Rul. 2005-61, I.R.B. 2005-38. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
CONVERSION TO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. A general 
partnership converted to a limited partnership with each partner’s 
share	in	the	partnership’s	profits,	losses,	debt	and	capital	remaining	
the same. The partnership business operation did not change. The 
IRS stated that, under Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157, the 
general partnership is not terminated because the business of the 
general partnership continued after the conversion. Under Rev. 
Rul. 84-52, (1) if the partners’shares of partnership’s liabilities do 
not change, there will be no change in the adjusted basis of any 
partner’s interest in the partnership; (2) if there is a change in the 
partners’shares of partnership liabilities, and such change causes 
a deemed contribution of money to the partnership by a partner 
under I.R.C. § 752(a), then the adjusted basis of that partner’s 
interest shall, under I.R.C. § 722, be increased by the amount 
of such deemed contribution; (3) if the change in the partners’
shares of the partnership’s liabilities causes a deemed distribution 
of money by the partnership to a partner under I.R.C. § 752(b), 
then the basis of that partner’s interest shall, under I.R.C. § 733, 
be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of such deemed 
distribution, and gain will be recognized by that partner under 
I.R.C. § 731 to the extent that deemed distribution exceeds the 
adjusted basis of that partner’s interest in the partnership and (4) 
under I.R.C. § 1223(1), there will be no change in the holding 
period of any partner’s total interest in the partnership. Ltr. Rul. 
200538005, June 14, 2005. 
RETuRNS. The IRS has published a summary of the tax 
filing	relief	for	hurricane	Katrina	victims	previously	announced	
in news releases. Notice 2005-73, I.R.B. 2005-42. 
The IRS has announced that taxpayers affected by Hurricane 
Katrina	now	have	until	February	28,	2006,	to	file	tax	returns	and	
pay any taxes due. This deadline follows legislation (Katrina 
Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005). For taxpayers located in 
areas hardest hit by Katrina, the tax relief will be automatic, 
and taxpayers will not need to do anything to get the extensions 
and other relief available. In areas where the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency has determined damage is more isolated, 
people will need to identify themselves to the IRS as hurricane 
victims. Taxpayers who believe they are entitled to relief should 
write	“Hurricane	Katrina”	in	red	ink	at	the	top	of	their	returns	 
and documents. IR-2005-12. 
	 The	IRS	has	announced	similar	filing	and	payment	deadline	
relief for victims of Hurricane Rita. This relief, similar to that 
granted victims of Hurricane Katrina, is automatic for taxpayers 
in counties designated by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency	 (FEMA)	 as	 “individual	 assistance	 areas;”	 however,	
taxpayers	in	areas	determined	to	be	“public	assistance	areas”	
will need to identify themselves to the IRS as hurricane victims. 
These	individuals	should	write	“Hurricane	Rita”	in	red	ink	at	the	 
top	of	any	forms	or	documents	filed	with	the	IRS.	Nine	counties	
in	Texas	and	five	parishes	in	Louisiana	have	been	determined	
to be individual assistance areas. The counties are: Chambers, 
Galveston, Hardin, Jasper, Jefferson, Liberty, Newton, Orange 
and Tyler. The parishes are: Beauregard, Cameron, Calcasieu, 
Jefferson Davis and Vermilion. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7508-
1(d)(1)		for	definition	of	affected	taxpayers.	Extensions	to	file	and	
pay do not apply to information returns in the W-2, 1098, 1099 
or 5498 series, to Form 1042-S, Foreign Person’s U.S. Source 
Income Subject to Withholding, or Form 8027, Employer’s 
Annual Information Return of Tip Income and Allocated Tips, 
or to employment and excise tax deposits. However, penalties 
for	 failure	 to	 timely	 file	 information	 returns	 can	 be	 waived	
under existing procedures for reasonable cause. The IRS has 
established a disaster hotline at 1-866-562-5227. IR-2005-
110. 
The IRS has published a revised Form 706, United States 
Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return which 
is to be used for decedents dying after December 31, 2004 and 
before January 1, 2006. 
S CORPORATIONS 
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayer was the sole owner 
of several S corporations which were used in the taxpayer’s real 
estate development business. One of the S corporations sustained 
a net loss in 1996 but the taxpayer could not deduct the losses 
because the taxpayer’s basis in the corporation was zero. In the 
following tax year the taxpayer personally borrowed funds from 
a bank and provided funds in two other S corporation accounts 
as security for the personal loan. The loan proceeds were 
transferred to the bank account for the net loss S corporation. 
The taxpayer then caused the net loss corporation to transfer 
the funds to the other S corporations’ bank accounts used for 
security for the loan. In turn, these two corporations transferred 
the funds to the taxpayer, resulting in no net gain to the taxpayer 
or any of the corporations. The court held that the contribution 
to the net loss corporation did not increase the taxpayer’s basis 
in the corporation because the contribution did not involve any 
actual economic outlay by the taxpayer. Therefore, the taxpayer 
was not allowed a loss deduction for the pass-through of losses 
from the net loss corporation. Kaplan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2005-218. 
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NEGLIGENCE 
WEED SPRAyING. The plaintiffs’ property was subject to 
a right-of-way granted to the defendant electric utility company 
which included 15 feet on either side of electrical transmission 
lines. The right-of-way granted the utility the right to clear 
vegetation around the transmission lines. The utility company 
hired the defendant spraying company to hand spray the right-
of-way with herbicide. The plaintiffs claimed that the spraying 
was done in such a way as to cause spray drift on to the plaintiffs’
peach orchard trees and other ornamental vegetation on the 
plaintiffs’ property next to the right-of-way, killing all of these 
plants. The plaintiffs claimed that the peach trees were 10 years 
old and had 5 to ten years of production left. The evidence at trial 
included	the	testimony	of	the	district	supervisor	in	the	Office	of	
Agriculture Environmental Sciences, Louisiana Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry who was an expert in crop damage and 
who	had	personal	knowledge	of	a	history	of	complaints	filed	by	
the	plaintiffs.	The	supervisor	testified	that	the	plaintiffs’	had	filed	
numerous complaints about damage to their trees from various 
sources	but	testified	that	the	peach	trees	were	much	older	than	
claimed by the plaintiffs and had been in a steady state of decline 
for	several	years.		The	supervisor	even	testified	that	one	complaint	
was	filed	the	day	before	the	spraying	occurred.	The	supervisor	
also acknowledged that the supervisor’s inspection of the property 
occurred more than eight months after the spraying and the effects 
on the plants could not be attributed directly to the spraying. The 
court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the action, holding that 
the	plaintiffs	failed	to	provide	sufficient	evidence	that	the	right-of-
way	spraying	was	the	specific	cause	of	the	damage	to	the	peach	
orchard and other plants. Kovac v. Spraymax, Inc., 2005 La. 
App. LEXIS 2066 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
PRODuCT LIABILITy 
CORN PICKER. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff 
attempted	to	clean	the	“husking	rollers”	on	a	used	corn	picker	
purchased by a neighbor from the defendant equipment dealer 
and manufactured by another defendant. The injury occurred 
while the plaintiff was attempting to use a corn stalk to free stuck 
corn cobs from the husking rollers while the machine was in 
operation. The plaintiff was operating the machinery to harvest the 
neighbor’s corn and had operated a corn picker one prior occasion 
almost 20 years ago. The trial court granted summary judgment 
to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff had assumed the 
risk of cleaning the husking machine while it was in operation. 
On appeal, the court held that the evidence was inconclusive to 
support summary judgment for the defendant in that an issue of 
fact remained as to whether the plaintiff assumed all risks inherent 
in operating a corn picker, including the cleaning method used 
here. The appellate court held that, in order to support summary 
judgment, the evidence must show that the plaintiff assumed the 
risk	of	 the	specific	danger	resulting	from	the	cleaning	method	
chosen. The court also noted that the plaintiff had little experience 
with corn pickers and had been operating this corn picker for only 
20 minutes before the accident happened. There was no discussion 
of the plaintiff’s causes of action. Hadar v. Avco Corp., 2005 
Pa Super LEXIS 3450 (Penn. Super. Ct. 2005). 
WATER RIGHTS 
SEVERANCE. The plaintiff purchased rural undeveloped 
land from the defendants and planned to develop the land for 
residential use. The defendants had acquired the property as an 
irrigated farm but decided to develop the water wells to provide 
water to a nearby growing municipal area. The defendants had 
applied to the state engineer for permits to separate the water rights 
from the land as part of the process of changing from irrigation 
to water utility; however, all of the paperwork was not completed 
at the time the land was sold to the plaintiff. In the land sale 
contract, the defendants did not reserve any water rights and the 
plaintiff sought to recover any water rights not fully severed by 
the defendants in the changeover process. The court held that the 
state engineer’s permit to allow the change in water use and the 
defendants’ actions to construct the water utility system created 
a rebuttable presumption that the water rights were severed from 
the land before the sale. The court held that the plaintiff had 
failed to provide any evidence of any retained water rights by 
the defendants at the time of the sale; therefore, no water rights 
remained to be conveyed with the land. Turner v. Bassett, 111 
P.3d 701 (N.M. 2005). 
ZONING 
DOWN ZONING. The plaintiffs owned several parcels of 
rural land just outside a densely populated city. The plaintiffs’
land was originally zoned to allow residential development of two 
houses per acre, with exceptions for cluster developments which 
had open areas set aside for parks. The defendant township passed 
an amended zoning ordinance which decreased the development 
density to one residence per six acres, again with exceptions for 
cluster developments. The defendant township argued that the 
zoning change was required to (1) protect natural resources; (2) 
maintain needed farmland; (3) preserve the rural character of 
the area; (4) preserve open space; and (5) respect the carrying 
capacity of the land. The court found no evidence that the zoning 
amendment furthered any of these purposes given the proximity 
of the land to the highly developed city and development of 
other areas near the plaintiffs’ land. Therefore, the court held 
that the zoning ordinance amendment was invalid and ordered 
reinstatement of the previous zoning requirements. Bailes v. 
Township of East Brunswick, 2005 N.J. Super. LEXIS 282 
(N.J. Super. 2005). 
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AGRICuLTuRAL TAX SEMINARS

October 20-21, 2005

I-80 Holiday Inn Grand Island, NE

Because of requests from past attendees and subscribers, the Agricultural Law Press will again 
sponsor expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax law. Gain insight and 
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax instructors. 
The seminars are held on Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one or both days, with separate 
pricing for each combination. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover Farm and Ranch Estate 
and Business Planning. On Friday, Dr. Harl will speak about Farm and Ranch Income Tax. Your 
registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended and lunch. 
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural
Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law (and for each one of multiple registrations from one 
firm)	are	$185	(one	day)	and	$360	(two	days). 
The registration fees for nonsubscribers	are	$200	(one	day)	and	$390	(two	days). 
All Digest subscribers should have received a brochure in the mail. Full information is also available 
from Robert Achenbach at 541-302-1958, e-mail: Robert@agrilawpress.com 
PRINCIPLES OF AGRICuLTuRAL LAW 
The Agricultural Law Press has issued a new edition of Principles of Agricultural 
Law in August 2005 in a new format. To celebrate the new format, the Agricultural 
Law Press is offering the Principles	at	$100.00	postpaid,	a	$15.00	savings	over	the	
regular price. Order your copy now and receive the next update (January 2006) 
free. Contact RobertAchenbach at 541-302-1958 or e-mail: Robert@agrilawpress. 
com 
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